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Concluding Remarks
By ROBERT A. SEDLER
I will limit my comments to the essential disagreement that I
have with the positions taken by Professor Trautman and Dean
Hay.1 My essential disagreement with Professor Trautman is over
the significance of multistate policies in the choice-of-law process.
Professor Trautman attaches great significance to multistate poli-
cies and correctly states that they play a small role "in the elabora-
tion of [Professor Currie's] theories by him and his successors." 2
His objection to the application of the forum's law in the case of
the true conflict, as advocated by Professor Currie and me, is on
the ground that this solution necessarily ignores multistate poli-
cies. As he states:
[I]n cases of conflict, the forum ... should apply its own law.
The purposes and policies to be advanced are then not viewed
from a multistate perspective, but from an arbitrarily limited and
parochial focus. As a result, there is a failure to advance some of
the purposes and policies at stake. The decision to apply forum
law thus ultimately defeats both goals I have stated; in addition it
seems impermissible and essentially lawless in a multistate
society.$
Our disagreement over the significance of multistate policies in the
choice-of-law policies reflects a more basic disagreement over the
function of a court in a conflicts case. I do not think that this
function is that of "policing the interstate and international legal
order" or of subordinating the policy underlying a rule of substan-
1. Dean Hay has correctly pointed out the inaccuracy of my previous statement in
regard to the constitutionality of the application of a state's law when that state could not
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction under a long-arm statute. Hay, Reflections on Conflict
of Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644, 1648 (1981). I have corrected the statement
in the present writing. See Sedler, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1628, 1642 n.6 (1981).




tive law in favor of supposed multistate policies.4 The courts do
not think that this is their function either, and in practice will not
subordinate the forum state's real interest in favor of multistate
policies.5 I do not consider it "lawless in a multistate society" for
the forum to apply its own law whenever the forum state has a real
interest in doing so in order to implement the policy reflected in
that law. I would further submit that in practice, the application
of the forum's law on this basis generally produces results that are
functionally sound and fair to the parties.0 Because Professor
Trautman and I disagree as to the proper function of a court in a
conflicts case, our positions as to choice of law in the case of the
true conflict are necessarily irreconcilable.7
The disagreement between Dean Hay and me is even more
fundamental. Dean Hay is very distressed with the present state
of conflicts law because of the apparent lack of concern for "con-
flicts justice" and with the "integrity of the system."8 He advo-
cates the formulation of "new principled rules" to govern choice-
of-law decisions and maintains that the formulation of such rules
is necessary to advance "conflicts justice" and the "integrity of the
system."9
The fundamental disagreement between Dean Hay and me is
over the present state of conflicts law. Unlike Dean Hay, I think it
is quite good. I contend that on the whole the courts have reached
functionally sound and fair results in the cases coming before them
for decision. 10 I think that choice of law, particularly in the inter-
state context,11 need not be all that complex12 and would further
4. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis
and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 218-20 (1977).
5. Id. at 231-33.
6. Id. at 227-31.
7. In the matter of the proper resolution of the unprovided for case, however, we come
out the same way, although we take different routes. Compare Trautman, Rule or Reason
in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1976) with Sedler, The
Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 233-36 (1977).
8. Hay, Reflections on Conflict of Laws Methodology, 32 HASTNGS L.J. 1644, 1661-62
(1981) (emphasis omitted).
9. Id. at 1661-66.
10. See note 6 supra. See also Sedler, On Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A
Critique of Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTRA L. RV.
807, 807-12 (1979).
11. The overwhelming majority of conflicts cases coming before American courts for
decision are interstate cases. Conflicts law in this country, therefore, has developed with
reference to the interstate case. International cases are accommodated within the frame-
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submit that it is the simplifying effect of interest analysis that has
enabled the courts to reach functionally sound and fair results in
the cases coming before them for decision.' s
If I am correct in my assertion that in practice the courts gen-
erally do reach functionally sound and fair results, then perhaps
the inquiry should focus on what it is that the courts are doing and
on why it is that they are reaching these results. Stated simply, we
might be better off if we were more concerned with the question of
"what is the proper result" instead of "what is the proper ratio-
nale." I do not believe that the proponents of "new solutions" can
demonstrate that the present state of conflicts law, as reflected by
the results the courts reach in practice, is truly "distressed."
'14
Thus, I continue to be skeptical about the "need for change."
work established for interstate cases, but relevant differences will be taken into account by
the court.
12. See Sedler, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1628,
1629 (1981).
13. See id. at 1631-35.
14. As Professor Leflar has observed: "The fact is that most American courts today
are moving to what they call the new law of conflict of laws. It is a conglomerate, and not a
bad one. In terms of location, this body of law is being lifted up by the courts to a well-
watered plateau high above the sinkhole it once occupied. No location lasts forever, and
there are vistas beyond the plateau, but it is a rest-stop for now." Leflar, Choice of Law: A
Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTMP'. PROB. 10, 26 (1977).
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